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 1 
Introduction 
 
In recent years there has been a growing disaffection with the standard economic paradigm of 
efficient markets and rational expectations. In an efficient market, asset prices are the outcome of 
the trading of rational agents, in the sense that they forecast the expected price by exploiting all the 
information available and know that other traders are rational. As pointed out by Fama (1970), if 
market were not efficient, there would be profit opportunities which would be exploited by the 
trading of rational agents. This implies that prices must equal the fundamental prices, given by the 
expected discounted dividend streams, and therefore changes in prices are only caused by changes 
in the fundamental value. In real markets, however, traders have different information on traded 
assets and process information differently, therefore the assumption of homogeneous rational 
traders may not be appropriate. In addition to this, the efficient market hypothesis motivates the use 
of random walk increments in financial time series modeling: if news about fundamentals are 
normally distributed, the returns on an asset will be normal as well. However the random walk 
assumption does not allow the replication of some stylized facts of real financial markets, such as 
volatility clustering, excess kurtosis, autocorrelation in square and absolute returns, bubbles and 
crashes. Recently a large number of models that take into account heterogeneity in financial 
markets has been proposed. The typical agents considered in these model are basically 
fundamentalists, who believe that prices tend to equal the fundamental value of an asset, and 
technical traders, who predict future prices by extrapolating past patterns in the time series. Recent 
contribution to this literature include Beja and Goldman (1980); Day and Huang (1990); Caginalp 
and Ermentrout (1990, 1991); Chiarella (1992); Sethi (1996); Gaunersdorfer (2000); Gaunersdorfer 
and Hommes (2005); Chiarella, Dieci and Gardini (2002, 2005); Franke and Sethi (1998); 
Westerhoff (2003, 2004a, 2004b). Brock (1997), Brock and Hommes (1997, 1998, 2001a) have 
introduced the important concept of financial markets as adaptive belief systems, in the sense that 
agents switch prediction rule among different predictors according to a fitness function that depends 
on the realized profits of a given prediction strategy. Chiarella and He (2001) analyze asset price 
and wealth dynamics in the framework of Brock and Hommes (1998) and Levy and Levy (1996) 
without switching among different predictors. Such a model is extended by adding a switching rule 
between momentum and contrarian strategies by Chiarella and He (2002) in the context of a 
Walrasian scenario and Chiarella and He (2003) and He (2003) in a market maker scenario. Brock, 
Hommes and Wagener (2005) analyze the limit evolution of Brock and Hommes (1998) when the 
strategies are distributed according to a continuous distribution; Thurner, Dockner and 
Gaunersdorfer (2002) analyze a market composed of a continuum of fundamentalists who show 
delays in information processing. These models allow for the formation of speculative bubbles, 
which may be triggered by news about fundamentals and reinforced by technical trading. Because 
of the presence of nonlinearities according to which different investors interact with one another, 
these models are capable of generating stable equilibria, periodic, quasi-periodic dynamics and 
strange attractors. 
 
In Chapter 1 we introduce a model built on that of Thurner, Dockner and Gaunersdorfer (2002), 
henceforth TDG, which is inspired by the Nosè (1984a,b, 1991) and Hoover (1985) models of 
thermodynamics and analyzes a financial market in which there are only fundamental investors who 
trade according to the mispricing of the asset with delays which are uniformly distributed from 
initial to current time. We generalize TDG by introducing a continuum of technical traders who 
behave as either trend followers or contrarians and a switching rule between these technical trading 
rules. As for the fundamentalists, technical traders react with uniformly distributed delays to the 
information that they receive from the market. We do not assume the existence of a Walrasian 
auctioneer, but allow for transactions to be made in a condition of disequilibrium by assuming the 
existence of a market maker who takes an offsetting long or short position so as to clear the market 
and set the price according to the direction and magnitude of excess demand. We analyze how the 
interaction of different types of investors with path dependent risk aversions determines the 
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dynamics and the statistical properties of the system as the proportion of fundamentalists, the 
growth rate of the fundamental, the speeds of reaction of the market participants and the intensity of 
switching between technical trading strategies are changed. In particular, the system is characterized 
by strange attractors that are capable of giving rise to time series of returns featuring stylized facts 
of real financial markets such as excess kurtosis, volatility clustering and long memory, even in a 
purely deterministic framework.  
 
Chapter 2 generalize the model by Chiarella, Dieci, Gardini (2006) by introducing a swiching rule 
between fundamentalists, trend followers and contrarians in a market cleared by a market maker. 
Differently from most of existing literature, we adopt a flow-based approach and utilize realistic 
values for the interest rate and the growth rate. In Chapter 3 we generalize the model by assuming 
both that agents are not fully informed and learn the fundamental price with delays and that there is 
a share issue proportional to change in wealth that modify the discount rate determining a discount 
rate much higher than the risk-free rate, contributing in this way to explain both equity premium 
puzzle and fundamental changes that are not triggered by news. 
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1. Asset Price Dynamics in a Financial Market with Heterogeneous 
Trading Strategies and Time Delays 
 
1.1 The model 
 
Let us consider a security continuously traded at price ( )tP . Assume that this security is in fixed 
supply, so that the price is only driven by excess demand. Following TDG, let us assume that the 
excess demand ( )tD  is a function of the current price and the fundamental value ( )tF . Differently 
from the standard financial economic literature, we assume that transactions are not made at 
equilibrium prices, but that a market maker takes a long position whenever the excess demand is 
negative and a short position whenever the demand excess is positive so as to clear the market. The 
market maker adjusts the price in the direction of the excess demand with speed equal to Mλ . The 
instantaneous rate of return is: 
 
 
( )
( ) ( ) ( )( ) 0;, >=
MM tFtPD
tP
tP λλ
&
 (1) 
 
the fundamental value is assumed to grows at constant rate g, therefore: 
 
 
( )
( ) gtF
tF
=
&
 (2) 
 
The market is composed of an infinite number of investors, who choose among three different 
investment strategies. Let us assume that a fraction α  of investors follows a fundamentalist strategy 
and a fraction ( )α−1  follows a technical analysis strategy. The fraction of technical analysts is in 
turn composed of a fraction β  of trend followers and a fraction ( )β−1  of contrarians. Let ( )tDF , 
( )tDTF  and ( )tDC  be respectively  the demands of fundamentalists, trend followers and contrarians 
rescaled by the proportions of agents who trades according to a given strategy. The excess demand 
for the security is thus given by: 
 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ]1,0,;]1[1 ∈−+−+= βαββαα tDtDtDtD CTFF  (3) 
 
Each trader operates with a delay equal to τ , that is, the demand of a particular trader at time t  
depends on her decision variable at time τ−t . Time delays are uniformly distributed in the interval 
[ ]t,0 . 
Fundamentalists react to the differences between price and fundamental value. The total demand of 
fundamentalists operating with delay τ  is: 
 
 
( ) ( )( ) 0;log >




−
−
=
τττ λ
τ
τλ FFF
tP
tF
tD  (4) 
 
where τλF  is a parameter that measures the speed of reaction of fundamentalist traders; we assume 
that FF λλ τ =  throughout the paper. This demand function implies that the fundamentalists believe 
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that the price tends to the fundamental value in the long run and reacts to the percentage mispricing 
of the asset in symmetric way with respect to underpricing and overpricing.1 
If time delays are uniformly distributed, the market demand of fundamentalists is given by: 
 
 
( ) ( )( ) 0;log0 >




−
−
= ∫
F
t
FF d
tP
tF
tD λτ
τ
τλ  (5) 
 
time differentiation yields: 
 
 
( ) ( )( ) 0;log >




=
FFF
tP
tF
tD λλ& . (6) 
 
Following TDG, let us modify equation (6) by introducing the variable ( )Ftς  and adding a term 
( ) ( )tDt FFς−  to the right hand side:2 
 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 0;log >−




=
FFFFF tD
tP
tF
tD λςλ& . (7) 
 
According to the sign of Fς , if there is an excess demand, the term ( ) ( )tDt FFς−  either drives it 
towards zero (if ( )Ftς  is positive) or foster it (if ( )Ftς  is negative). The variable ( )Ftς  may be 
interpreted as an indicator of the risk that traders bear and their risk aversion (if ( )Ftς  is negative, 
traders become risk-seekers). The dynamics for ( )Ftς  are given by: 
 
 ( ) ( ) 0;][ 2 >−= FFFFF VtDt δδς&  (8) 
 
where FV  is a variance-controlling factor. Throughout the paper, we will assume that FV  is given. 
The economic motivation of equation (8) is that, the larger an open position on the asset, the more 
risk averse the investors become. 
Let us consider now the behavior of technical traders. As for the fundamentalists, their time delays 
are uniformly distributed in the interval [ ]t,0 . A trader operating with delay τ  utilizes the 
percentage return that occurred at time τ−t  in a linear prediction rule in order to form an 
expectation of future returns. The demands of trend followers and contrarians operating with delay 
τ  are respectively: 
 
( ) ( )( ) 0; >




−
−
=
τττ λ
τ
τλ TFTFTF
tP
tP
tD
&
 (9) 
 
( ) ( )( ) 0; <




−
−
=
τττ λ
τ
τλ CCC
tP
tP
tD
&
 (10) 
 
                                                 
1
 TDG utilize ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ττλτ −−−= tPtFtD FF  as functional form for the demand of fundamentalists. We rather utilize 
function (4) because we consider more plausible that fundamentalists react to mispricing in percentage terms. Of course 
if  ( )τ−tF  and ( )τ−tP  are in logarithm terms, the fundamentalist demand of TDG is equivalent to (4). 
2
 TDG introduce the variable ξ , which is linear transformation of ( )tD F , and utilize it instead of ( )tD F . We will 
continue to utilize the variable ( )tD F  without any loss of generality. 
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throughout the paper we will assume that TFTF λλ τ =  and CC λλ τ = . By integrating (9) and (10) with 
respect to τ  and time differentiating we get the time derivatives of the total demands of technical 
analysts, which are: 
 
 
( ) ( )( ) 0; >




=
TFTFTF
tP
tP
tD λλ
&
&
 (11) 
 
( ) ( )( ) 0; <




=
CCC
tP
tP
tD λλ
&
&
. (12) 
 
As for the fundamentalists, we add now the terms ( ) ( )tDt TFTFς−  and  ( ) ( )tDt CCς−  in order to take 
into account the risk and risk attitude of chartists. Time derivatives of their total demands are 
therefore: 
 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0; >−




=
TFTFTFTFTF tDt
tP
tP
tD λςλ
&
&
 (13) 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 0; <−




=
CCCCC tDt
tP
tP
tD λςλ
&
&
. (14) 
 
Following TDG, the dynamics for ( )tTFς  and ( )tCς  are: 
 
 ( ) ( ) 0;][ 2 ≥−= TFTFTFTFTF VtDt δδς&  (15) 
 ( ) ( ) 0;][ 2 ≥−= CCCCC VtDt δδς&  (16) 
 
We will now consider the fraction α  as given, whereas the fraction of trend followers β  may be 
path dependent. In fact β  is considered as an endogenous variable because both trend followers and 
contrarians follow technical analysis strategies and therefore may be likely to switch them if one 
brings about higher returns. We assume that the more profitable is a strategy, the more investors 
will choose that strategy. The difference in the absolute return at time t between the two strategies is 
given by ( ) ( ) ( )][ tDtDtP CTF −& . The use of absolute returns as a measure of evolutionary fitness 
stems from the absence of wealth in the model, therefore it is not possible to calculate the 
percentage return of a strategy. Moreover, β  must be bounded in the interval [ ]1,0  and we assume 
that it tends to move towards 0.5 if both the strategies lead to equal profits. These assumptions can 
be taken into account if we assume this functional form for the time derivative of ( )tβ : 
 
  ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] 0;cot ≥−+= ztDtDtPztt CTF&& piββ  (17) 
 
where the first term keeps the fraction of trend followers bounded in the interval [0,1] and z is a 
parameter that measure the speed of switching between the technical strategies. The proportion 
tends to 0.5 if the two strategies are characterized by the same absolute return. Therefore, the 
dynamics are ruled by the following nine ordinary differential equation system: 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )[ ][ ] [ ]
( ) ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( )
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2
2
2
piββ
δδς
δδς
δδς
λςλ
λςλ
λςλ
λαββααλ
 (18) 
 
If z=0 or if the proportion of trend followers and contrarians is taken as a constant, then the system 
may be made stationary by defining the variable ( ) ( )( )tP
tF
tM ≡ . In this case System 18 becomes: 
 
  
( ) ( )[ ] ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]
( ) ( )[ ]rgtMtM
VtDt
VtDt
VtDt
tDtrtD
tDtrtD
tDtMtD
CCCCC
TFTFTFTFTF
FFFFF
CCCCC
TFTFTFTFTF
FFFFF
−=
>−=
>−=
>−=
<−=
>−=
>−=
&
&
&
&
&
&
&
0;
0;
0;
0;
0;
0;log
2
2
2
δδς
δδς
δδς
λςλ
λςλ
λςλ
 (19) 
 
where r is defined as ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) [ ] 0;1,0;]]1[1[ >∈−+−+≡ MCTFFM tDtDtDr λαββααλ . Equations 
(1) and (3) imply that r is the rate of return on the asset. System 19 has equilibrium points only for a 
zero-Lebesgue measure parameter set. Indeed, if the system is on an equilibrium point, 
( ) ( ) ( ) 0=== ttt CTFF ςςς &&&  and the equilibrium demands are: 
 
  
CCTFTFFF VDVDVD ±=±=±= ;;  (20) 
 
Moreover, the rate of return is equal to the growth rate of the fundamental, so that, plugging the 
equilibrium demands into the equation for r, we obtain that the following equality relation between 
parameters must hold for the system to have equilibrium points: 
 
  ( ) ( )( )( )CTFFM VVVg ββααλ −±±−+±= 11  (21) 
 
1.2. Statistical properties 
 
In this section, we analyze the statistical properties of the simulated time series, which have been 
generated by integrating the system up to time 7529 and recording the price at integer times starting 
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from 4000=t  in order to allow the system to get sufficiently close to the asymptotic dynamics and 
to have time series as long as the daily time series of the S&P500 index between 1 January 1990 
and 31 December 2003. The system has been integrated by utilizing the default method of 
Mathematica 5, which switches between BFG and Adams algorithms depending on the stiffness of 
the system. No stochastic elements are added, because we are interested in analyzing how the 
interaction among different investors, whose risk aversions are time varying, may reproduce the 
stylized fact observed in real financial markets: volatility clustering, fat tails, no autocorrelation 
between returns and long memory. Thus the features of system-generated time series are 
endogenous and originate from the nonlinear structure of the system. The model displays statistical 
properties similar to those of the S&P500 index using various parameter values. In Table 1 there are 
reported the mean, maximum, minimum, variance, skewness, kurtosis and the results of the Jarque-
Bera test of the daily returns on the S&P500 and on the time series generated by the differential 
equation system with parameters and initial values reported respectively on Table 2 and Table 3 and 
identified as Example 1 and Example 2. We have also reported in Table 1 the value of the largest 
Lyapunov exponent for Example 1.1 The distribution functions, autocorrelations of returns and 
square returns up to lag fifty are illustrated in Figure 1 and Figure 2. 
 
 Mean Maximum Minimum Variance Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Lyapunov 
exponent 
S&P 500 0.000375309 0.0573148 -0.0686674 0.000110923 -0.0163294 6.49388 1794.62  
Example 1 0.000369353 0.0587311 -0.0709184 0.000105104 0.0690029 6.59998 1908.44 0.241898 
Example 2 0.000366283 0.0563845 -0.0550595 0.0000852793 0.0880204 6.2641 1325.25  
Table 1: Statistics for S&P500, Example 1 and Example 2 and Lyapunov exponent of Example 1. 
  
 
Mλ  Fλ  TFλ  Cλ  α  Fδ  TFδ  Cδ  FV  TFV  CV  g  z  
Example 1 60 95/15 0.25 -0.22 0.4 240000 240000 240000 1/54000 1/54000 1/54000 0.000319 0 
Example 2 55 5 0.24 -0.25 0.4 240000 216000 216000 1/90000 1/90000 1/90000 0.000319 4 
Table 2: Parameter values of Example 1 and Example 2. 
 
 P  F  FD  TFD  CD  Fς  TFς  Cς  β  
Example 1 1.1 1 ( ) ( )[ ]0/0log* PGFλ  0 0 1 1 1 0.5 
Example 2 1.1 1 ( ) ( )[ ]0/0log* PGFλ  0 0 1 1 1 0.5 
Table 3: Initial values of Example 1 and Example 2. 
 
The growth rate of the fundamental, g, is equal to the mean growth rate of S&P500, which in turn 
has been calculated as the rate that in a continuously compounded capitalization regime implies the 
same return on the index on the overall period. Since the price moves around the fundamental, the 
means of the simulated time series match that of the S&P500. The other parameter values have been 
chosen so as to give rise to statistics similar to those of the S&P500 index. In TDG, the variable that 
accounts for the variance is FV , in this model variance control is much more complicated, as there 
exist three different types of investment strategies, each characterized by a potentially different 
value of V. 
 
                                                 
1
 The Lyapunov exponent of Example 2 is not been reported because the trajectories of the price and fundamental are 
unbounded and the system cannot be made stationary by performing a change of variables, therefore the Lyapunov 
exponent would be meaningless. 
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Figure 1: Standardized distributions of returns (red histograms) and standard normal distribution (blue lines) for S&P500 index from 
1 January 1990 to 31 December 2003 (a) , Example 1 (b) and Example 2 (c). 
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Figure 2: Autocorrelations of returns (blue lines) and square returns (green lines) for S&P500 index from 1 January 1990 to 31 
December 2003 (a) , Example 1 (b) and Example 2 (c). 
 
We have considered the case where trend followers and contrarians have the same values of V  and 
δ , whereas fundamentalists may be characterized by different values, due to the smaller difference 
between two technical strategies than between technical and fundamentalist strategies. CTFF VVV ,,  
are constants because otherwise the unconditional variance would be in turn variable. For instance, 
the TDG setting with our specifications for the demand functions, FV ε= , would give rise to time 
series whose variance increases over time. Such a behavior is not typical of real time series, whose 
variances tend to be constant, unless there occur structural changes, or anyway do not follow well 
defined trends. CTFF VVV ,,  affect not only the variance, but skewness and kurtosis as well, and the 
relation is not monotonic. They may even bring about a global bifurcation of the system. As pointed 
out by TDG, kurtosis and volatility clustering are due to the delayed reaction of investors that 
determines price overshooting. In a multi-agent modeling, such a process is fostered by the 
interaction among investors who are heterogeneous not only as concerns the time that they need to 
process information from the market, but also the strategies that they use to predict future prices. 
Real time series show little or no autocorrelation in returns and significant autocorrelations in 
square or absolute returns, which decay according to power laws, because of volatility clustering. 
Time series are also characterized by long memory and nonlinear structure. The model by TDG 
displays negative first order autocorrelations, close to 0.5, because of the presence of only 
fundamentalists that tends to drive the price back to its long period fundamental value. The 
introduction of trend followers should cause this autocorrelation to fall because price overshooting 
is more likely to occur. The action of contrarians should have less predictable effects on the 
autocorrelation, as these investors may offset both fundamentalists and trend followers. However 
the simulations give rise to significant autocorrelation that  nevertheless decays very quickly. The 
significance of autocorrelations is due to the absence of medium and long term trends. The 
autocorrelations of square returns instead decay much faster than those of S&P500, because of the 
fact that the price moves around the exponential fundamental trend in the long run. Changes in the 
speed of switching between technical strategies may affect qualitatively the system dynamics, and, 
even in the case where the dynamics remain qualitatively unchanged, they may determine large 
variations in the statistical properties, even if the proportion between trend followers and 
contrarians remains close to 0.5. In the simulations that we have run, the smaller variance in 
Example 2 is mostly due to the introduction of  switching between technical strategies rather than to 
the decrease in CTFF VVV ,, . Kurtosis tends to rise as TFλ  and Cλ  rise, whereas variance and 
skewness do not show a clear dependence on such parameters. Skewness tends to be slightly 
positive, conversely to the time series of the S&P500 index, which instead show a slightly negative 
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skewness. Positive skewness is due to the exponentially growing fundamental value that determines 
that large price overshooting is on average positive. Price overshooting, which also determines 
kurtosis in returns, is induced by both the delayed reaction of investors and the interaction between 
fundamentalists and trend followers, as the latter may reinforce a trend triggered by the former. On 
the long run, fundamentalists cause the price to growth. Contrarians’ trading may not be sufficient 
to offset trend followers’, and moreover it may happen that the demands of both trend followers and 
contrarians have the same sign, because of the delay in investors’ reactions and the different 
dynamics of risk attitudes. The mean returns on time scales of 1,5,10 and 15 days are shown in 
Figure 3. It is apparent that returns cluster together on all the time scales, confirming an underlying 
long memory process. Such characteristics are typical of multifractal process. Let us consider a 
stochastic process ( )tx  and define the increment between t  and tt ∆+  in the following way: 
 
  
( ) ( ) ( ) Tttxttxttx ≤≤−∆+=∆ 0;, . (22) 
 
Let us assume now that increments are stationary and the distribution of ( )tx ∆,0  is invariant with 
respect to time shifts. According to Mandelbrot, Fisher and Calvet (1997), a multifractal process is a 
continuous time process with stationary increments which satisfy: 
 
  
( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1],[ +∆=∆ qq tqcttxE τ  (23) 
for each tt ∆,  on which x  is defined and for each )[ ]max,0 qq ∈  such that ( ) ∞<∆ ],[ qttxE , where E 
is the expectation operator. The scaling function ( )qτ  determines the variations in expected value as 
time scale changes. Mandelbrot, Fisher and Calvet (1997) prove that scaling functions remain 
unchanged only for bounded time intervals, that is, multifractal processes must show transitions in 
their scaling properties or crossovers. Taking the logarithms of equation (23) we get: 
 
  
( ) ( )[ ] ( )( ) [ ]tqqcttxE q ∆++=∆ log1log],[log τ  (24) 
 
If ( ) ( ) ( )0loglog PtPtx −=  then ( )ttx ∆,  approximates the return on the time series ( )tP  in the 
interval [ ]ttt ∆+, . The plots of ( ) ],[log qttxE ∆  of the S&P500 and the simulated time series with 
respect to [ ]t∆log  for q=1,1.5,2,2.5,3 are drawn in Figure 4. Since we are interested only in the 
scaling function ( )qτ  and not in the intercept, the values have been normalized by subtracting 
[ ]( ) ]10log,[log qtxE . Time intervals ranges from 1 to 100 days. There is no apparent crossover up 
to a time scale of 100 days in the time series of S&P500, thus confirming its multifractal nature. In 
the simulations, crossover occurs for values of t between 3e  and 4e  and the fluctuations are more 
erratic than those of S&P500. Such a behavior underlines the capability of the model to generate 
dynamics typical of a multifractal process, however the exponential growth in the fundamental 
value implies an exponential long run growth in the expected returns, which in turn implies that 
crossover occurs for smaller time intervals than those of real time series. 
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Figure 3: Time series of returns on time scales of 1, 5, 10 and 15 days on S&P500 index (left), Example 1 (middle), Example 2 
(right). 
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Figure 4: Plots of ( ) ],[log qttxE ∆  against [ ]t∆log  on S&P500 index (a), Example 1 (b), Example 2 (c) for q=1,1.5,2,2.5,3 
respectively in red, green, blue, purple and grey. 
 
1.3. Comparative dynamics 
 
In this section we will first analyze the dynamics for the system identified as Example 1, the 
dynamics for the other example being very similar, and then we will study the variations in 
dynamics as parameters change. In Figure 5 there are depicted the time series in the interval 
[ ]7529,7029  of prices, returns, proportion of trend followers out of the total of technical traders (it 
is constant because z=0), demands, risk attitudes and the projection of the phase space on the planes 
],[ FFD ς , ],[ TFTFD ς , ],[ CCD ς , ],[ TFF DD , ],[ TFF DD , ],[ CTF DD . Tables 4-10 show the mean, 
maximum, minimum, variance, skewness, kurtosis, Jarque-Bera and Lyapunov exponent for 
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different parameters values. From the graph of the price, two type of trends are apparent: there is an 
upward long period trend that matches the dynamics of the fundamental value and is due to the 
trading of fundamentalists and upward and downward short period trends that oscillate around the 
long run trend and are instead due to the trading of technical analysts as well as to the delayed 
reaction of the fundamentalists. Short period cycles are characterized by considerable variations in 
both frequency and amplitude. Such a variability is due to the heterogeneity in strategies and time 
horizons and is reinforced by the variability in risk attitudes. The demands of technical traders 
switch between positive and negative phases, differently from the fundamentalist demand, which 
instead tends to move around zero. The average demand of fundamentalists is slightly positive, 
because of the upward trend in the fundamental value. The presence of long phases of positive and 
negative demands of technical traders, together with the dynamics for the risk aversion may 
determine very large price oscillations in both directions. In fact, long phases of positive demand 
provoke considerable increases in price, associated with strong sales from the fundamentalists. The 
increase in the fundamental value triggers a stock price increase due to the purchases by 
fundamentalists, which is reinforced by the action of trend followers, whereas contrarians tend to 
sell the stock. The opposite behavior of trend followers and contrarians is shown on the projection 
of the phase space on the space of technical analysts’ demands: the attractor is stretched along the 
bisector between the first and third orthant. The demand of fundamentalists has smaller oscillations 
in the periods where the risk aversion is high, because a high risk aversion induces the 
fundamentalists not to open large positions if the stock is mispriced. Whereas the risk aversion of 
fundamentalists follows well defined trends and is on average positive, those of technical traders 
tends to oscillate around zero. As such, technical traders switch between phases in which they are 
risk averse and phases in which are risk seekers. The dynamics for the risk attitudes may be 
explained in the following way: let us assume that the price is rising and the demand of trend 
followers is positive and greater than TFV . Equation 15 implies that their risk aversion rises as 
well. The increase in price reduces the demand of fundamentalists and contrarians, but reinforces 
that of trend followers, which on the other hand tends to fall because of the increase in their risk 
aversion. Once the price falls, the demand of trend followers approaches zero (eventually becoming 
negative) and, as a consequence, their risk aversion falls. The dynamics are also the same in the 
case where the cycle is triggered by fundamentalists or contrarians. The only difference is that the 
demand of these investors will eventually change sign independently of their risk attitudes whereas 
the demand of trend followers are self-fulfilling because the price movements they induce in turn 
reinforce the demands, given the risk aversion. The projections of the attractor on the planes 
],[ FFD ς , ],[ TFTFD ς , ],[ CCD ς  show the interactions between demands and risk attitudes. The 
different shape of the projection on the plane ],[ FFD ς  is due to greater amplitude and lower 
frequency of the dynamics of fundamentalists’ risk aversion than those of the other investors. In any 
case, however, risk attitudes may vary considerably even during phases in which the demands are 
almost steady. Indeed it is sufficient that the absolute value of the demand of investors type i 
remains for a long time respectively above iV  to get a considerable change in risk aversion. The  
time  derivatives  of the  risk  attitudes  tend  to  reach  their  lower bounds, which are respectively 
equal to FFVδ− , TFTFVδ−  and CCVδ− , only when the demands are very close to zero.  
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Figure 5: Time series of prices (a), returns (b), proportion of trend followers of technical traders (c), demand of fundamentalists (d), 
trend followers (e), contrarians (f), risk aversion of fundamentalists (g),  trend followers (h), contrarians (i), projections of the phase 
space on the planes ],[ FFD ς  (j), ],[ TFTFD ς  (k), ],[ CCD ς  (l), ],[ TFF DD  (m), ],[ TFF DD  (n), ],[ CTF DD  (o) for the time 
interval [7029,7529]. 
 
1.3.1 Effects of changing the proportion of fundamentalists and technical traders. In order to 
analyze the effect of the proportion of fundamentalists and technical traders, we select values of α  
ranging from 0 to 1 and with a difference of 0.1 between a simulation and the next. If there are no 
fundamentalists or if their proportion is only ten percent, the price goes to infinity, because 
technical trading drives the price away from the fundamental.1 If 2.0=α  the fundamentalists are 
able to steer the price to the fundamental value, but prices are subject to large oscillations induced 
by technical traders. Such oscillations become larger and larger as time goes on. In fact larger 
departures from the fundamental value are needed for the fundamentalists to bring the price back 
                                                 
1
 The price goes to zero with other parameter values. What matters here is that the price does not match the fundamental 
in the long run. 
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close to the fundamental value. The dynamics for the fundamentalist demand differ considerably 
from the baseline case where 4.0=α , in fact the departure from the fundamental value brings about 
long phases in which the fundamentalists go either long or short on the asset, determining in this 
way an increase in their risk aversion. This in turn implies a lower capability of offsetting technical 
traders. The overall demand of the latter presents long phases in which the demand is either positive 
or negative, phases in which it changes sign quickly and phases where the demands of contrarians 
and trend followers offset each other. This latter feature is called synchronization in the dynamical 
systems literature. During phases of synchronization the system reduces by one dimension. When 
the technical demand is equal or close to zero, fundamentalists bring the price back close to the 
fundamental value. As a consequence of the fact that the total demand does not change sign for long 
periods, the price tends to follow a monotonic trajectory when it is far from the fundamental and to 
oscillate as it gets close to it. Thus, the synchronization of technical traders determines an 
intermittent behavior in the system with regular monotonic phases interrupted by chaotic bursts. 
The time series of fundamentalist and technical demands are depicted in Figure 6. If α  is equal to 
0.3 the proportion of fundamentalist is sufficiently high as to prevent technical trading from 
bringing about larger and larger departures from the fundamental value. The oscillations have 
anyway larger amplitudes than in the case where 4.0=α , and this in turn determines an increase in 
the variance and a decrease in the kurtosis. If fundamentalists account for half of the investors, the 
demand of technical traders is generally lower than in the baseline case because fundamental 
trading prevents strong changes in the price. This leaves little room for a persistent phase of 
fundamentalist demand and therefore fundamentalists are more likely to became risk seekers. The 
higher proportion of fundamentalists determines a more regular behavior of the system, as denoted 
by the decrease in kurtosis. If the fraction of fundamentalists is equal to or greater than sixty 
percent, the system no longer converges to a strange attractor. Furthermore, the only attracting 
invariant set is a quasi-periodic attractor, as denoted by the values of the Lyapunov exponents. 
Moreover, as the proportion of fundamentalists in the market increases, the amplitude of the 
oscillations reduces. If there are only fundamentalists the attractor becomes strange again and the 
Lyapunov exponent rises up to 0.523002, which would indicate a highly chaotic system. However 
the rise in the Lyapunov exponent is due to the increase in the amplitudes of the oscillations that in 
turn are due to the overreaction induced by the delayed reaction of fundamentalists, which brings 
price above (below) the fundamental price when the security is originally underpriced (overpriced).  
 
1.3.2. Effects of changing the growth rate of the fundamental value. Increases in g cause a 
stronger activity of the fundamentalists on the market. The price tends to remain close to the 
fundamental value and the amplitude of the price oscillations is smaller, therefore the variance 
decreases as g increases. If g is four times greater than in the baseline case the action of 
fundamentalists is so strong as to break the strange attractor into a limit cycle. If g is five times 
greater, the system converges to a quasi-periodic attractor. The attractor is a limit cycle for g equal 
to or greater than six times the baseline case. 
 
α  Mean Maximum Minimum Variance Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Lyapunov 
exponent 
0.2 0.00210084 0.281998 -0.223493 0.00347306 0.657885 4.55161 608.396  
0.3 0.000902394 0.161515 -0.115126 0.00117017 0.151231 3.91785 137.289 0.268056 
0.4 0.000369353 0.0587311 -0.0709184 0.000105104 0.0690029 6.59998 1907.9 0.241898 
0.5 0.00034002 0.0309093 -0.0298682 0.0000438907 0.164723 5.05137 634.548 0.175174 
0.6 0.000505747 0.0351398 -0.032607 0.000360944 0.0181459 1.57432 298.98 0.0989546 
0.7 0.000542628 0.0235851 -0.0309212 0.000432451 0.0149926 1.50448 328.907 0.0288602 
0.8 0.000425532 0.0235851 -0.0225013 0.000227566 0.0137007 1.50864 327.061 0.0345303 
0.9 0.000323392 0.00685721 -0.00633042 0.0000171097 0.0046185 1.51802 322.865 0.0124616 
1 0.000502513 0.108746 -0.0974863 0.000367779 0.397363 15.0274 21357.8 0.523002 
Table 4: Mean, maximum, minimum, variance, skewness, kurtosis, Jarque-Bera and Lyapunov exponent for Example 1 as α  varies 
from 0.2 to 1. The Lyapunov exponent is not reported for α=0.2 because is meaningless when the dynamics are not bounded. 
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Figure 6: In Panel a there are represented the total demands of fundamentalist (in black), trend followers (in blue) and contrarians (in 
red) respectively given by FDα , ( ) TFDβα−1  and ( )( ) CDβα −− 11  when 2.0=α  and 5.0=β . In Panel b there is depicted the 
total technical  demand, given by the sum of the demands of trend followers and contrarians. Total excess demand, given by equation 
(3), is depicted in Panel c. Time interval ranges from 4000 to 7529. 
0.000319
g
 
Mean Maximum Minimum Variance Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Lyapunov 
exponent 
0 0.0000537886 0.0495222 0.0452839 0.000118037 0.027382 5.16913 692.095 0.252298 
1 0.000369353 0.0587311 -0.0709184 0.000105104 0.0690029 6.59998 1907.9 0.241898 
2 0.000684626 0.0610451 -0.0564503 0.0000919609 0.109867 5.82433 1179.69 0.224348 
3 0.000994219 0.0414887 -0.0391781 0.0000699423 0.124856 5.70547 1085.14 0.204809 
4 0.00129316 0.0191797 -0.0148457 0.0000362081 0.342639 3.63877 129.012 0.00105954 
5 0.00159735 0.00478863 -0.00147119 (2.93407)10 -6 0.0557558 1.81467 208.364 0.00214585 
6 0.00191871 0.00426463 -0.000423662 (2.72064)10-6 -0.00054509 1.50511 328.501 0.00123471 
Table 5: Maximum, minimum, variance, skewness, kurtosis, Jarque-Bera and Lyapunov exponent for Example 1 as g varies from 0 to 
6·0.000319. 
 
1.3.3. Effects of changing the speed of adjustment of the market maker. A higher value of the 
speed of reaction of the market maker determines a greater response of the price to a given excess 
demand and this in turn brings about an increase in the variance. This in turn determines a greater 
disorder in the system. For instance, if 40;20=Mλ  the trajectories are periodic, if 30;10=Mλ  the 
attractor is strange but more tidy than in the standard case. Indeed, the Lyapunov exponents are 
respectively equal to 0.0021286 and 0.0012897 and the return distributions are approximately 
normal. In Figures 7 and 8 there are reported the phase plots respectively for Mλ  equal to 20 and 
30. 
1.3.4. Effects of changing the speed of expected price adjustment of fundamentalists. 
Increasing the speed reaction of fundamentalists brings about a decrease in the variance because the 
price tends to stay close to the fundamental. The system undergoes a transition as the parameter Fλ  
is increased, that is, the dynamics shows a cyclical behavior after a transient chaotic phase. This 
kind of transition, called attractor destruction, is a type of crisis-induced intermittency and has been 
investigated by Grebogi, Ott, Romeiras and Yorke (1986) and Grebogi, Ott, Romeiras and Yorke 
(1987). However, for large values of Fλ  the attractor becomes strange again; if 40=Fλ  the 
Lyapunov exponent is 0.127318, that is, the system is weakly chaotic due to the overreaction of 
fundamentalists. This case is similar in some respects to that where there are only fundamentalists 
on the market, indeed kurtosis rises up to 10.1876. Because of the presence of technical traders, 
which are affected by the changes in prices triggered by the fundamentalists, it is not possible to 
determine what the dynamics eventually are as the reaction speed of the fundamentalists is further 
increased. For instance, if 190=Fλ  the dynamics are periodic, but if  300=Fλ  the attractor is 
strange, with a Lyapunov exponent of 0.240876, and is characterized by an intermittent behavior. 
Mλ  Mean Maximum Minimum Variance Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Lyapunov exponent 
10 0.000330484 0.0206878 -0.0201229 0.0000253034 0.0387064 3.48532 35.505 0.183651 
20 0.000360739 0.0176783 -0.0168995 0.0000794659 0.170052 1.97156 172.483 0.0021286 
30 0.000365441 0.0331703 -0.0319962 0.000081857 0.017598 3.02064 0.24473 0.159328 
40 0.000357116 0.014606 -0.0172128 0.0000779788 -0.206538 1.9594 184.261 0.0012897 
50 0.000361973 0.0197733 -0.0142528 0.0000844143 0.241145 2.0067 179.23 0.0014726 
60 0.000369353 0.0587311 -0.0709184 0.000105104 0.0690029 6.59998 1907.9 0.241898 
70 0.000381041 0.0793545 -0.0628766 0.000128775 0.145983 7.13087 2520.95 0.233348 
80 0.000405412 0.0669915 -0.0570457 0.000172349 0.157421 4.88388 536.273 0.235278 
90 0.00041944 0.0631928 -0.0533371 0.000204906 0.0882721 4.03829 163.054 0.257029 
100 0.000425154 0.0978468 -0.0698592 0.000234512 0.160142 4.68113 430.533 0.250071 
Table 6: Maximum, Minimum, Variance, Skewness, Kurtosis, Jarque-Bera and Lyapunov exponent for Example 1 as Mλ  varies 
from 10 to 100. 
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Figure 7: Projections of the phase space on the planes ],[ FFD ς  (a), ],[ TFTFD ς  (b), ],[ CCD ς  (c), ],[ TFF DD  (d), ],[ TFF DD  
(e), ],[ CTF DD  (f)  when 20=Mλ . 
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Figure 8: Projections of the phase space on the planes ],[ FFD ς  (a), ],[ TFTFD ς  (b), ],[ CCD ς  (c), ],[ TFF DD  (d), ],[ TFF DD  
(e), ],[ CTF DD  (f)  when 30=Mλ . 
 
Fλ  Mean Maximum Minimum Variance Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Lyapunov exponent 
19/15 0.00055803 0.0825522 -0.0761281 0.000483397 0.101521 3.75793 90.5049 0.260045 
38/15 0.00048943 0.0905994 -0.0713038 0.000324588 0.0888249 3.6847 73.5548 0.20373 
57/15 0.000434872 0.054647 -0.054509 0.000234301 0.0296036 3.25936 10.4036 0.243968 
76/15 0.000398758 0.0697828 -0.0714307 0.000157999 0.174213 5.02767 622.226 0.247527 
95/15 0.000369353 0.0587311 -0.0709184 0.000105104 0.0690029 6.59998 1907.9 0.241898 
114/15 0.000370917 0.0694991 -0.0494394 0.000104576 0.236946 6.56116 1897.24 0.232318 
133/15 0.000368247 0.0610275 -0.0395701 0.0000912715 0.256507 3.44351 67.603 0.00113966 
152/15 0.000368016 0.0736272 -0.0701349 0.0000930663 0.213145 4.98602 606.522 0.00244454 
171/15 0.000356914 0.0190932 -0.0147682 0.0000847965 0.163268 1.78405 233.018 0.00236142 
190/15 0.000352543 0.0593143 -0.0400121 0.0000674469 0.145138 6.65448 1975.6 0.064413 
40 0.000327483 0.0215197 -0.0206138 0.0000167665 0.0946897 10.1879 7602.37 0.127318 
190 0.000373124 0.0427878 -0.0428233 0.000112505 0.158359 4.63448 407.577 0.0739194 
300 0.000472087 0.0845286 -0.0675717 0.000316402 0.273594 4.19152 252.783 0.240876 
Table 7: Maximum, Minimum, Variance, Skewness, Kurtosis, Jarque-Bera and Lyapunov exponent for Example 1 as Fλ  varies from 
19/15 to 190/15 and for Fλ  equal to 30, 190, 300. 
 
1.3.5. Effects of changing the extrapolation speed of trend followers and contrarians. From the 
values of the Lyapunov exponent, it is apparent that for low values of TFλ  and Cλ  the system 
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converges to a limit cycle. The dynamics may explode or converge to a price equal to zero if 
contrarians are much more reactive than trend followers, as in the cases where 
19.0;17.0;16.0=TFλ . This result is due to the risk aversion dynamics that cause the demands of 
trend followers and contrarians to have the same sign, because contrarians become risk seekers or 
not sufficiently risk averse to offset the trend followers. The price diverges to infinity or converges 
to zero when the demand of technical traders remains positive or negative (in these cases the 
statistics are meaningless and therefore are not reported in Table 8 and 9). When the system 
converges to a strange attractor, the statistics do not show a clear dependence on TFλ  and Cλ . 
Skewness tends to be slightly positive, differently from the time series of the S&P 500 index, which 
is instead slightly negative skewed. Positive skewness is due to the short term overshooting, as 
explained in Section 3. Overshooting, which causes also kurtosis in the time series, is induced by 
both the delayed reaction of investors and the interactions between fundamentalists and trend 
followers, since the latter may reinforce a trend triggered by the action of the former and contrarian 
trading is not sufficient to offset the trend followers. If we increase the reactivity of technical 
traders, the system becomes more regular, as trend followers and contrarians tend to balance each 
other. The dynamics are less regular if we only increase the reaction parameter of trend followers, 
because they prevail over contrarians.  
 
1.3.6. Effects of switching between trend following and contrarian strategies. So far we have 
dealt with a model where the proportion between trend followers and contrarians are kept constant. 
If 0>z  such proportions become path dependent. The higher the value of z, the higher the fraction 
of trend followers because this strategy is generally more profitable than the contrarian one, since 
price grows in the long run. This higher presence of trend chasers may render the system chaotic. 
 
TFλ  Mean Maximum Minimum Variance Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Lyapunov exponent 
0.15 0.000384673 0.0187929 -0.0242905 0.000135443 -0.355236 2.13223 184.895 0.00263052 
0.16 - - - - - - - - 
0.17 - - - - - - - - 
0.18 0.000372227 0.0173602 -0.0222974 0.000117359 -0.290264 2.03177 187.349 0.0010877 
0.19 - - - - - - - - 
0.20 0.000378055 0.0598837 -0.0553325 0.000117933 0.133162 6.00388 1336.85 0.201067 
0.21 0.00038489 0.122849 -0.0810554 0.000131612 0.387327 10.6243 8633.27 0.221105 
0.22 0.000369102 0.0272894 -0.0259532 0.0000990937 0.037827 3.71217 75.3983 0.209684 
0.23 0.000367604 0.0593017 -0.0495785 0.0000994084 0.146344 6.06788 1396.14 0.238593 
0.24 0.000366941 0.0481003 -0.0573432 0.0000990906 -0.00316219 5.81994 1168.96 0.237215 
0.25 0.000369353 0.0587311 -0.0709184 0.000105104 0.0690029 6.59998 1907.9 0.241898 
Table 8: Maximum, Minimum, Variance, Skewness, Kurtosis, Jarque-Bera and Lyapunov exponent for Example 1 as TFλ  varies 
from 0.15 to 0.25. 
 
Cλ  Mean Maximum Minimum Variance Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Lyapunov exponent 
-0.15 0.000369556 0.0213667 -0.0158433 0.000106152 0.179352 1.91581 191.707 0.0021656 
-0.16 0.000372044 0.0211957 -0.015605 0.000102849 0.181869 1.92979 187.815 0.0024273 
-0.17 0.000370366 0.0210591 -0.0156312 0.000099644 0.186281 1.95433 181.137 0.0026694 
-0.18 0.000380905 0.0478136 -0.0481585 0.000121981 0.0891421 4.88654 527.85 0.230824 
-0.19 0.000377074 0.0465356 -0.0424717 0.000115556 0.0318894 4.71706 433.996 0.226468 
-0.20 0.000376226 0.0505584 -0.0478036 0.000109272 0.105942 5.21538 728.061 0.246516 
-0.21 0.00036901 0.0523215 -0.0468544 0.0000991786 0.11308 5.38548 844.025 0.233281 
-0.22 0.000369353 0.0587311 -0.0709184 0.000105104 0.0690029 6.59998 1907.9 0.241898 
-0.23 0.000369951 0.0864171 -0.0585479 0.000102825 0.138732 6.8382 2176.89 0.213399 
-0.24 0. 0.000376719 0.0723912 -0.0645418 0.000114519 0.047148 7.25154 2658.42 0.227939 
-0.25 0.000396688 0.0706271 -0.0654394 0.000159497 0.263336 15.3175 22343.7 0.158465 
Table 9: Maximum, Minimum, Variance, Skewness, Kurtosis, Jarque-Bera and Lyapunov exponent for Example 1 as Cλ  varies from 
-0.15 to -0.25. 
 
Let us consider the case with constant proportion where 16.0=TFλ  and 15.0−=Cλ . The system 
converges towards a limit cycle. If 50=z  the system, after an initial chaotic phase, until 1000≈t , 
approximates a regular orbit very similar to the limit cycle obtained with constant proportion and 
 17 
eventually becomes chaotic as 6600≈t . Indeed, the dynamics approximate a limit cycle as long as 
the proportion remains close to 0.5. The phase space projections of the system in the time interval 
[ ]2200,2000  are represented in Figure 9. The fraction of trend followers is on average equal to 
0.503711 and tends to oscillate between 0.48 and 0.54 with a variance of 0.000248758. If 100=z  
there are larger oscillations in the composition of technical analysts. Indeed, while the mean of the 
fraction of trend followers remains slightly over half (0.508117), the variance increases up to 
0.00264788.1 The higher proportion of trend followers causes greater departures from the 
fundamental value triggering a reaction by all types of investors. Such dynamics bring about an 
increase in the variance and the kurtosis of returns. If z is increased up to 150 and subsequently up 
to 500, the oscillations in the proportion between technical traders become larger and the variance 
of returns increases further, while kurtosis decreases because the increase in variance determines 
that some returns previously in the tails of the distribution now approach the center. 
 
z  Mean Maximum Minimum Variance Skewness Kurtosis Jarque-Bera Lyapunov 
exponent 
0 0.000419108 0.0204648 -0.0259058 0.000187242 -0.184689 1.7386 253.951 0.00137831 
50 0.000420392 0.0568036 -0.0711078 0.000191746 -0.16719 2.8211 21.1409  
100 0.000467982 0.0851743 -0.164496 0.000304584 -0.035824 8.06507 3772.03  
150 0.000565746 0.126586 -0.125605 0.000493903 0.122439 6.1863 1501.23  
500 0.000994454 0.154838 -0.128476 0.00136727 0.222942 4.19228 238.189  
Table 10: Maximum, Minimum, Variance, Skewness, Kurtosis, Jarque-Bera and Lyapunov exponent for Example 1 for 
z equal to 0, 50, 100, 150, 500. 
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Figure 9: Projections of the phase space on the planes ],[ FFD ς  (a), ],[ TFTFD ς  (b), ],[ CCD ς  (c), ],[ TFF DD  (d), ],[ TFF DD  
(e), ],[ CTF DD  (f)  when 16.0=TFλ , 15.0−=Cλ  and z=50 in the time interval [2000,2200]. 
 
1.3.7. Effects of introducing a feedback between real and financial sectors.  We assume that the 
fundamental value is affected by the asset price. The economic rationale is that a higher price boosts 
consumption and, as a consequence, the real economy as a whole. We assume that the dynamics of 
the fundamental follows the differential equation: 
 
  
( )
( )
( )
( ) 5.0; =+= mtF
tP
mg
tF
tF&
 (25) 
 
The introduction of this kind of feedback induces a unit root behavior in the price time series with 
scaling properties very to those of S&P500. This is apparent from Figure 10 where there are 
reported the simulated time series and the plot of ( ) ],[log qttxE ∆  against [ ]t∆log . Indeed the 2R  values 
                                                 
1
 The mean and variance of trend followers are computed in the time interval from 4000 and 7529, as the statistics of 
time series of returns. 
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are ( ) ,986382.012 ==qR ( ) 987.05.12 ==qR , ( ) ,987352.022 ==qR  ( ) ,98752.05.22 ==qR  
987641.0)3(2 ==qr . 
 
 
Figure 10: Time series of price (left panel) and plot of ( )[ ]qttxE ∆,log  against [ ]t∆log  with price-fundamental 
feedback. 
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2. A Model of Heterogeneous Traders with State-Dependent Switching 
of Strategies 
 
2.1. The model 
 
Let us consider a financial market where at each time unit a risky and a risk-free assets are traded. 
The market is composed of three different type of investors: fundamentalists, trend followers and 
contrarians. Let tiW ,  be the wealth of investor type i in period t, P and F be the logarithms of the 
price and fundamental value of the risky asset, g the interest rate paid by the risk-free asset and 1, −tiz  
the proportion of wealth the investors type i invest in the risky asset. The wealth of investor i at time 
t is given by: 
 
 
( ) ( )1,,1,1,1,1,, 1 −−−−− −+−+= ttititititititi PPzWgzWWW  (1) 
 
Chiarella and He (2001) proved that the optimum proportion of risky asset at time t obtained by 
maximising the expected utility of wealth at time t+1 is approximated by the following: 
 
( )
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( )tt
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ttt
tttt
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11,
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++
++
σ
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where iδ    is respectively the risk aversion of investor i and ( )tittti PP ,12 1,, −++σ  is the expected 
variance of the return on the risky asset at the next period predicted by the investor. Therefore, if 
each traders maximize the expected value of a CARA utility function [ ]tiiW ,exp δ−− , the solution to 
the optimization problem leads to the following dollar value demand for the risky asset: 
 
 
( )
( ) 0;
,1
2
1,,
11,,
,
>
−
−−
=
++
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i
titttii
tttti
ti PP
gPPE
D δ
σδ  (2) 
 
as proved by Chiarella and He (2001). Alternatively, the same solution is obtained in terms of 
wealth proportions if we assume that the market is composed of homogeneous investors who 
allocate their wealth according to fundamentalist, trend following and contrarian strategies and 
maximize the following CRRA utility function: 
 
( ) ( )
( )
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=
≠−
−
=
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1;log
1;1
1
1 1
δ
δδ
δ
W
W
WU . 
 
This assumption of CRRA utility function maximization lead to a market where at each period 
every agent allocate their wealth across three different strategies with proportions that are the same 
for each investors. Let fD  be demands of fundamentalists, trend followers and contrarians 
respectively. The fundamentalist prediction of the returns on the risky asset at time t estimated at 
time t-1 by assuming that the returns will be proportional to the difference between the logarithms 
of  fundamental and price: 
  
 
( ) ( )1,0;111,, ∈−= −−− ηη ttttf PFE . (3) 
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Thus, the fundamentalists assume that price will mean-revert in the long run to the fundamental 
value with a speed determined by the value of η . Indeed Equation (3) implies that, if investors 
believe that the fundamental is constant, ( ) ( )( )ttttttf PFPFE −−=− +++ η111,1, .1 We assume that the 
fundamentalist risk aversion and estimated variance are constant. The estimation of variance by the 
trend followers and contrarians is instead an increasing function of the absolute value of the 
estimated excess return. This assumptions has a stabilizing effect on the system because it tends to 
prevent trend followers from triggering self-generated prophecies that will drive the price to infinity 
or zero when gttf −,ψ  becomes large. Following Chiarella, Dieci, Gardini (2002) we assume that 
chartist demand is specified by a function ( ) ctfjgh tj ,;, =−ψ  such as h’>0, h(0)=0, there exist a 
value of the expected excess return ( )**
,
gq tj −= ψ  such that h’’<0 (>0) for all ( ) ( )( )qgqg tjtj <−>− ,, ψψ  and ( ) 0'lim , =−±∞→ gh tiψψ . We assume the following functional 
form for h: 
 
 
( )[ ] ctfjgD ttjjjtj ,;arctan 1,,, =−= +ψθγ  (4) 
 
where the subscripts tf and c identify the trend followers and contrarians. 1,, +tttfψ  and 1,, +ttcψ  are the 
expected returns of the technical traders on the risky asset, which are updated as a weighted average 
of current estimation and respectively return, if traders are trend followers, or the opposite of return, 
if traders are contrarians, that is: 
 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )1,0;)1(
1,0;)1(
1,,,1,1,,
1,,,1,1,,
∈−−−=
∈−+−=
−−+
−−+
ctiticttccttc
tftititftttftftttf
cPPcc
cPPcc
ψψ
ψψ
 (5) 
 
The market is composed of a fraction tfn ,  of fundamentalists and ttfn ,  of trend followers. This 
implies that the fraction of contrarians is ttftf nn ,,1 −− . Conversely to the majority of the literature 
on heterogeneous agent modelling, where the current holdings of the assets is not taken into account 
when defining the market excess demand, we assume more realistically that it is given by the 
difference between the optimal and actual holdings of the assets of all types of investors. Therefore 
the market demand is approximated by:2 
 
 
( )1,1,1,1,1,1,,,,,,, −−−−−− ++−++= tctcttfttftftftctcttfttftftft DnDnDnDnDnDnξ  (6) 
 
The market is cleared by the action of a market maker who offset the imbalances in market demand 
by taking an offsetting short (long) position on the risky asset if market excess demand is positive 
(negative). The market maker adjust the price as a function of the market demand and the 
mispricing of the asset, pursuing in this way also a stabilizing actions. The log-price change is given 
by the following linear difference equation: 
 
 
( ) 0;1 >−+=−+ βαξβ ttttt PFPP  (7) 
 
                                                 
1
 This applies if the fundantamentalists believe that the fundamental is constant. This result still holds if the 
fundamentalists believe that fundamental is time-varying by adding the expected fundamental change to Equation (3). 
2
 We do not consider that the value of the previous period holdings changes because of the variation in the price of the 
risky asset occurring between two consecutive trading periods. Such changes tends to be negligible as the trading period 
become smaller. 
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where α  and β  measures the speed of reaction of the market maker with respect to market excess 
demand and mispricing. The fundamental grows exponentially at a rate φ , therefore F evolves 
according to the following equation: 
 
 φ+=+ tt FF 1  (8) 
 
We assume that the more profitable is strategy, the more investors will switch to that strategy. 
Following Brock and Hommes (1997,1998) and Brock, Hommes, Wagener (2001) the proportions 
of agents who trade according to strategy i evolves according to an evolutionary fitness  measure 
Ui,t . This fitness measure is subject to an IID noise generated by a double exponential distribution. 
This assumptions imply that as the number of agents goes to infinity, the probability that an agent 
trades according to strategy i is given by the following “Gibbs” probability: 
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tiU ,  depends inversely on the fitness of a strategy. Agents tend to switch to the prediction rule that 
has the highest fitness. λ  is the intensity of choice and measure the speed of switching among 
different strategies. If 0=λ  the proportions do not change and are equal to 1/3, if +∞→λ  in each 
period each trader choose the strategy with the highest fitness. We assume the following fitness 
functions: 
 
 
[ ]( )[ ]21,,1,,1,,, log −−− −−−= titittitititi PPEPPU  (10) 
 
The logarithm simplify with the exponential and therefore prevents the agents from switching too 
fast, indeed equation (9) simplify to:  
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An exponential switching may provoke a speculative bubble when the trend followers monopolize 
the market and the price would converge to zero or diverge to infinity. The fitness function that we 
utilize rules out this possibility and does not require a penalty function as in Gaunersdorfer, 
Hommes and Wagener (2000). 
The system may be made stationary by introducing the variables ttt PFM −≡  and 1−−≡ ttt PPρ . In 
this way the system reads as: 
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where: 
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Equations (11) and (12) define a ten-dimensional difference equation system and imply the 
following the characterisation for the equilibrium:  
Proposition 1. The system given by (11) and (12) has a fixed point such that : ctf EE −=== φρ , 
0== cf nn , 1=tfn , αφ /=M  if and only if 0≠α .   
Proof. If the system is on a fixed point, from the first two equations of (11) we get that 
ρ=−= ctf EE . The third equation implies that φρ =t . Since only the trend following strategy 
features a mean square error of zero, it follows from the equations governing the dynamics for in  
that 0== cf nn  and 1=tfn , i.e. only trend followers survive and monopolize the market. As a 
consequence, (12) implies that the excess demand ξ  is zero and by replacing for ρ  in the second 
equation of (12) we obtain αφ /=M .  
 
Therefore at the fixed point the asset is mispriced but both the price and the fundamental value 
grows at the same rate. Since there are no fundamentalists on the market the stabilization of the 
price at the fundamental value happens because of the action of the market maker. Since the market 
maker take only into account the current difference between fundamental and price but not the 
growth rate of the fundamental, a mispricing remains that depends on the fundamental growth. Such 
mispricing may be easily eliminated by changing the behaviour of the market maker, therefore the 
fixed point may be considered as a fundamental state state. 
 
Proposition 2. If 5.0>λ  and ( ) ( )( ) 011 22 >−+
+
−−+ φθ
θβγα
αα
g
cc
c
tf
tftftftf
tf  the fixed point is locally stable. 
The fixed point undergoes a Neimark-Sacker bifurcation when 
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ] 01/1 22 =−++−−+ φθθβγααα gccc tftftftftftf . 
Proof: If we define the lagged variables ;;; 1,,2,1,1,,2,1,1,, −−−−−−− === tftftttfttctttftttf nvZZ ψψ  
1,, −= ttfttf nv  ; 1−= tt ML , by substitution in the system given by Equations (11) and (12), an 
equivalent a 10-dimension first order difference map is obtained, whose Jacobian matrix is: 
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where ( )Tctfctftffctf vvLZZnnMψψ=K . At the fixed point 
cctftfcctftf vnvnLMZZ ===== ;;;;ψψ , therefore by replacing tfψ  , cψ , M, ntf and nc and the 
lagged variables with their equilibrium values we obtain:  
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K∂
∂ 'fn
 and 
K∂
∂ 'tfn
 are indeterminate at the fixed point, therefore in order to check for the stability and 
bifurcations it is needed to check the limit as the variables approach the equilibrium values. Let us 
define the functions ( )ctf nnx ,,1ϑ  and ( )ctf nnx ,,2ϑ  as the functions defined by K∂
∂ 'fn
 and 
K∂
∂ 'tfn
 
where ( ) ( )φαφα −=−= LMx . By replacing tfψ , cψ , M and the lagged variables with the 
equilibrium values φ , φ−  and αφ / ,  a few algebraic manipulations imply that at the equilibrium  
( )
ctf nnx ,,1ϑ  and ( )ctf nnx ,,2ϑ  are respectively: 
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The degrees of the functions at the numerators and denominators of each component of 
K∂
∂ 'fn
 and 
K∂
∂ 'tfn
 imply that if 5.0>λ , ηα ≠ ,  
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If 5.0<λ  the limit does not exit and if 5.0=λ  the limit tends to a finite value. The last five rows 
of the jacobian matrix are: 
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It follows from the structure of the Jacobian matrix that six eigenvalues are zero, while the 
remaining four are equal of those of the following matrix: 
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 (16)  
  
One eigenvalue is cc−= 1µ , thus is always inside the unit circle and the manifold tangent to the 
associated eigenvector is stable. As a consequence, the equilibrium is locally stable if the 
eigenvalues of the following matrix are also inside the unit circle: 
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The characteristic equation of Q is ( ) 032213 =+++=Γ pppQ ξξξ , where ( )Qtracep =1  ; p2 is 
defined as the sum of the principal minor of Q and ( )Qp det3 = . Sonis (2000) proves that a  
necessary and sufficient condition for stability is 0,, 321 >∆∆∆  where: 
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If 01 =∆  two eigenvalues lies inside the unit circle and the third is 1=µ ; therefore the fixed point 
undergoes a fold bifurcation; if 02 =∆  two eigenvalues lies inside the unit circle and the third is 
1−=µ ; therefore the fixed point undergoes a flip (period doubling) bifurcation; if 03 =∆  one 
eigenvalue lies inside the unit circle and the remaining two satisfy ϑpiµ ie23,2 = . 0, 21 >∆∆  for any 
feasible parameter values, thus the fixed point may lose the stability only with a Neimark-Sacker 
bifurcation. Q.E.D.  
 
The functional form of 3∆  implies the following: 
 
1) The price adjustment that the market maker performs in order to prevent the mispricing from 
becoming too large may be actually destabilizing if ( )( ) 11/ 22 >−+ φθθβγ gc tftftftf , that is, if trend 
followers are not very risk averse, extrapolate strongly, the market maker is highly reactive to 
excess demand or if the difference between the rates of interest and growth is low. Indeed, the price 
adjustment from the maker toward the fundamental may trigger a strong reaction from the trend 
followers if they are highly reactive. This in turn brings about a strong price effect is the market 
maker is characterised by a high value of β . If the fundamental growth rate is close to the interest 
rate, the demand for the risky asset is low and this tend to stabilize the price.  
 
2) The stability depends does not depend on the behavioural parameters of fundamentalists and 
contrarians, however these parameters affects the size of the stability region and the global 
dynamics as will be shown through numerical simulations. The local stability is not affected by the 
parameters governing the dynamics of the fundamentalists and contrarians because these agents 
disappear from the market when the system is at the equilibrium, however the trend followers must 
trade as fundamentalists for the system to remain at the equilibrium. Therefore the equilibrium 
becomes unstable if trend following trading is so strong as to give rise to large departure from the 
fundamental price. 
 
3) In a stock based market, i.e. a market where the agents does not take into account current 
holdings and the market demand would be only given by the first order terms of the RHS of 
Equation (6), the Neimark-Sacker condition is given by 
( ) ( )( ) 01/1 22 =−+−−+ φθθβγαα gcc tftftftftf , therefore if ( ) ( )1,0∈+ αtfc  a flow-based market is 
stable for a wider range of parameters. The converse happens if ( ) ( )2,1∈+ αtfc . 
 
2.2 Analysis of bifurcations and global dynamics 
 
We consider two different baseline model, with parameters reported in Table1.  Those models have 
been examined by performed a numerical analysis of global dynamics and stochastic simulation by 
adding noises to the systems, as explained in the following section. Table2 reports the initial value 
of the system variables employed in the simulations. 
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 α β g γtf γtc θtf θc ctf cc a η φ  λ 
System1 0.0005 0.005 0.00025 70 70 10 10 0.3 0.2 46 0.01 0.0002 2.8 
System2 0.0005 0.0055 0.00025 1400 600 1.4 3.6 0.3 0.25 45 0.006 0.0002 0.15 
Table 1:parameters values of System1 and System2. 
 
 
 ( )0tfψ  ( )0cψ  ( )0tfZ  ( )0cZ  nf ntf vf vc 
 0.01 0 0 0 0 1/3 0 1/3 
Table 2: initial values of system variables in numerical simulations. 
 
System 1 and System2 differ basically for the speeds of prediction rule switching and technical 
trading reactions. The parameters have been selected as to give place to simulated time series 
similar to those generated by real markets on a daily time scale. The selected values for the interest 
and growth rates imply annual rates equal to g=6.44% and %12.5=φ  if a year is assumed to be 
composed of 250 trading days. The fundamentalists assume that on average a mispricing is reduced 
in a daily time unit by about 1% in System1 and 0.6% in System2. The selected values of a and η 
determine the relations between risk and expected return represented in Figure 1.  
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Figure 1: Relations between expected return and risk aversion of fundamentalists for System1 and System2. 
 
As far as the behaviour of the technical traders is concerned, while in System1 they behave in 
symmetrical way, except for the extrapolation speed that is slightly higher for trend followers, in 
System2 the difference between tfγ  and cγ  is almost completely offset by the difference between in 
tcθ  and cθ . Indeed, as shown in Figure2, the absolute value of optimal demands of trend followers 
and contrarians are very similar, with contrarians a little risk averse for expected return within the 
interval [-0.1777,-0.1782]. The values of α  has been chosen quite small with respect to β , because 
we assume that the price changes are mainly driven by the trading of the investors and the role of 
the market maker consists substantially of clearing the market with the reduction of the mispricing 
only a residual function. 
 
 30 
- 0 . 2 - 0 . 1 0 0 . 1 0 . 2
A b s @ ψ t f D , A b s @ ψ c D
0
1 0 0
2 0 0
3 0 0
4 0 0
d
n
a
m
eD
 
Figure 2: The absolute value of the demands of trend followers (black) and contrarians (red) as tfψ  and cψ  vary 
between -0.25 and 0.25. 
 
System1 is characterised by a strange attractor and a strange repeller at the selected parameter 
values. The convergence to the attractor may be very slow and the speed of convergence is highly 
dependent on initial conditions. The attractor features very small proportions of fundamentalists and 
ctc ψψ ,  are very close to zero. In Figure 3 are represented the time series of the last 20000 
observations, obtained after a transient phase of 10000 iterations, of ctc ψψ , , tff nn ,  and the 
projections on planes ( )ctf ψψ ,  and ( )tff nn , . In Figure 4 are displayed the time series and 
projection for 7.0=tfC  and 2.0=cc , the system converges to a strange attractor very similar to the 
repeller of left panel of Figure 3 but features a very high expected return variance. and The left 
Panel displays the dynamics with the initial values reported in Table 2, the right Panel has instead 
been obtained changing the initial expected returns and proportions to  ( ) ( ) 3275.000 == ff vn and 
( ) ( ) 3725.000 == tftf vn . It is apparent that in the first case the system is still close to the chaotic 
repeller. Figure 5 displays on planes ( )tff nn ,  (left panel) and ( )ctf ψψ ,  (right panel) the sets of 
values ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )00,00 tftfff vnvn ==  and 0,1,tfψ , 0,1,cψ  such that the system is still close to the repeller 
after 20000 iterations (in dark grey) and the set of values 0,1,tfψ , 0,1,cψ  and of 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )00,00 tftfff vnvn ==  (in light grey) such that the system has already converged to the 
attractor after 20000 iterations. The white triangle in the left planes identify initial proportions of 
fundamentalists and trend followers that are not feasible because otherwise the proportion of 
contrarians would be negative.  
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Figure 3: Time series of expected returns of trend followers and contrarians, proportions of fundamentialists and trend 
followers, projections of the time series on planes ( )
ctf ψψ ,  and ( )tff nn ,  of System1 with baseline initial values (left 
panel) and ( ) ( ) 3275.000 == ff vn  and ( ) ( ) 3725.000 == tftf vn  (right panel). 
 
 
Figure 4: Time series of expected returns of trend followers and contrarians, proportions of fundamentialists and trend 
followers, projections of the time series on planes ( )
ctf ψψ ,  and ( )tff nn ,  of System1 with ctf=0.7 and cc=0.2 
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Figure 5: Sets of values ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )00,00 tftfff vnvn ==  (left panel) and 0,1,tfψ , 0,1,cψ  (right panel) such that the system 
is still close to the repeller after 20000 iterations (in dark grey) and the set of values 0,1,tfψ , 0,1,cψ  and of 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )00,00 tftfff vnvn ==  (in light grey) such that the system has already converged to the attractor after 20000 
iterations. 
 
Figure 6 reports the 2-parameters bifurcation diagrams on the parameter spaces ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tftfctfctf gacc θγβαθθφγγη ,;,;,;,;,;,;, 21  , which have been obtained by iterating the 
system up to 1000 iterations after transient of 20000 and reports 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8-period cycles in 
different colours, the area associated to higher period cycle, quasi-periodic or chaotic attractors are 
drawn in a grey scale with lighter colours associated to a larger number of different values of tfψ . 
Two values are assumed to be different if their percentage difference is less than 0.001. The areas 
where the price diverges are plotted in yellow. The big points identify the parameter values of 
baseline model and the small one identify parameter values for which we calculated the 
autocorrelograms reported in Figure 16-19. The Neimark-Sacker curve is plotted white if it is inside 
the range of simulated parameter values. It can be checked by calculating the value of 3∆  that the 
baseline model is outside the stability region. The presence of other attractors than the fixed point 
within the Neimark-Sacker boundary makes it apparent that the system is characterised by 
coexistence of attractors. The importance of such phenomenon in determining calm and turbulent 
market phases with the associated volatility clustering has been pointed out by Hommes (1998) 
where a model is presented such that due to the degeneracy of the Neimark-Sacker bifurcation that 
gives place to a Chenciner bifurcation, which imply the co-existence of stable fixed point 
surrounded by a stable invariant curve. In our model, a stable fixed point co-exist with a periodic, 
aperiodic cycles and strange attractors. The basin of attraction of the fixed point tends to be very 
small and shows a Cantor structure as denoted by the magnification of parameter space ( )tftf θγ ,  
reported in Figure 7, indeed it is very likely that the systems switches among different basins when 
buffeted with stochastic noise. Low values of the fundamental growth rate with respect to the 
interest rate determine the convergence toward a period-2 cycle. It is assumed that φ <g because 
otherwise the fundamental value would be infinite, if the fundamental is defined as the discount 
value of the dividend stream increasing at a rate φ . It is apparent from the 2-bifurcation diagrams 
( )
ctf θθ ,  and ( )ctf γγ ,  that ctf ,γ nd ctfc , have similar effects on the asymptotic dynamics, in fact the 
system is likely to converge to the fixed point with low values of such parameters and to cycles or a 
strange attractor if the parameters are increased. The basin of attraction of the fixed point is wider if 
tfγ  or tfθ  have respectively the similar magnitude of cγ  or cθ , and in some cases the simulations 
converges to the fixed point for parameter values up to the Neimark-Sacker  boundary. Therefore if 
technical traders are not so reactive as to destabilise the equilibrium, contrarians may perform a 
stabilizing action because offset the trend followers. Therefore, even if the Neimark-Sacker 
bifurcation does not depend on the behavioural parameters of contrarians, a global analysis points 
out that a model with contrarians may be more stable than a model with only trend followers 
because the former affect the size of the basin of attraction of the fixed point. Higher values of the 
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reaction speeds of contrarians have on the other hand a destabilizing effect because tend to bring 
about too large price corrections. Very high contrarians’ reactions break down the attractor into a 2-
period cycle. The same is true as far as the speeds of expected return updating ct, , cc are concerned. 
The 1-parameter bifurcation diagrams shown in Figure 11 denotes that high values of tfγ , tfθ  and 
c1 change the scale of the system, that is, the asymptotic dynamics show converge toward attractors 
having a large volume. The 1-parameter bifurcation diagrams denote that an increase in the size of 
the attractor is related to the reaction speed of trend followers, therefore if a threshold value is 
passed, trend following trading may determine a turbulent phase with high volatility, and this 
threshold is directly dependent on contrarian trading. The time series and 2-dimensional phase 
space projection for 7.0=tfc and 2.0=cc  are represented in Figure 4. The similarities with the 
repeller depicted in the left panel of Figure 3 are appartent, however the volume of the attractor is 
larger and the variance of expected returns is higher. The fact that tfγ  and tfθ  show the same 
behaviour in determining the stability of the system is denoted from the bifurcation diagram of ( )tftf θγ ,  where the convergence toward the fixed point and periodic cycle has a pattern resembling 
the Neimark-Sacker boundary and an high value of tfθ  must be associated to a low value of tfγ  in 
order to preserve the stability. The set of parameters such that the system converge to the 
equilibrium is not connected, therefore it always co-exists with other attractors. Fundamentalists 
does not perform a stabilizing action either. Indeed a higher value of a and η  does not stabilize the 
system and may instead destabilize it. Very high values of the expected mispricing correction and 
low values of fundamentalist risk aversion and/or expected variance will give rise to price 
divergence. This is due to the overreaction and price overshooting, which in turn trigger a strong 
response from trend followers. This phenomenon is also apparent from the 2-parameter bifurcation 
diagrams ( )η,a . In a discrete time model, price overshooting may is more likely to occur than in a 
continuous-time even if trend following trading is weak. While in the model dealt with in the 
previous chapter, fundamentalists may overshoot the fundamental value because of information 
processing delays, in this model a strong fundamentalist trading may  make to price jump to a value 
higher (lower) than fundamental, if the asset were initially underpriced (overpriced). The 
bifurcation diagram of ( )βα ,  denotes a chaotic window for intermediate values of β . α  can 
stabilize the system only for low values of β  because a high value of price sensitivity to excess 
demand trigger a strong response from the investors. 
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Figure 6: 2-parameter bifurcation diagrams of parameters 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )tftfctfctf gacc θγβαθθφγγη ,;,;,;,;,;,;, 21 ; ( )tftfc γ,  of System1. The panel at the right bottom display the 
colours associated to cycle periodicity. 
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Figure 7: magnification of the bifurcation diagram ( )tftf θγ , . The Cantor structure is apparent. 
 
In Figure 8 there are represented the time series of the last 20000 observations, obtained after a 
transient phase of 10000 iterations, of ctc ψψ , , tff nn ,  and the projections on planes ( )ctf ψψ ,  and ( )tff nn ,  of System2. With these parameter values, the model does not show the co-existence of 
chaotic repellers and chaotic attractors. 
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Figure 8: Time series of expected returns of trend followers and contrarians, proportions of fundamentalists and trend 
followers, projections of the time series on planes ( )
ctf ψψ ,  and ( )tff nn ,  of System2 with baseline initial values. 
 
An analysis of the bifurcation diagrams  points out the following difference in the dynamics 
between System1 and System2: 
 
1) In System2 cc  gives place to an oscillatory dynamics only for an interval of values, that is, there 
must be a balance between extrapolation speeds of trend followers and contrarians, a low risk 
aversion and/or low expected variance of contrarians determine a strong demand from these 
investors with high pricing switching and disorder in the system. If trend followers extrapolate 
strongly, contrarians are no longer able to offset trend followers and therefore the periodicity 
window disappear. 
 
2) The bifurcation diagram ( )η,a  has a much simpler structure with only three periodicity band and 
does not show any patter toward any kind of stabilization. The fundamentalists were not able to 
render the system more tidy in System1 and this behaviour is reinforced in the present case because 
of the stronger reactivity of technical traders due to higher values of ctcctf θθγγ ,,, . 
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3) High values of tfγ  and/or tfθ  determine an increase in the volume of the attractor and a change 
in the shape, unless they are associated to high values of of cγ  and/or cθ . In fact, the bifurcations 
diagrams displays a band with intermediate values of tfγ  ( tfθ ) and cγ  ( cθ ) where the system 
converges to the baseline chaotic attractor. In Figure 9 are represented the time series of 
ctc ψψ , , tff nn ,  and the projections on planes ( )ctf ψψ ,  and ( )tff nn ,  with 2000=γ  100=cγ . 
Figure 10 illustrates the case of convergence to 2 chaotic bands that occurs when contrarians update 
the expected return much faster than trend followers, in fact 2.0=tfc  and 9.0=cc . 
 
 
Figure 9: Time series of ctc ψψ , , tff nn ,  and projections on planes ( )ctf ψψ ,  and ( )tff nn ,  with 2000=γ  
100=cγ . 
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Figure 10: Time series of ctc ψψ , , tff nn ,  and projections on planes ( )ctf ψψ ,  and ( )tff nn ,  with 2.0=tfc  and 
9.0=cc . 
 
4) The market maker cannot affect qualitatively the system dynamics for a wide set of parameter 
values, in fact, expect for a small periodicity window, the asymptotic dynamics remains chaotic. 
High values of α  ( )β   decrease (increase) the volume of the attractor. 
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Figure 11: 2-parameter bifurcation diagrams of parameters ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( );,;,;,;,;,;,;, 21 ffctfctf cgacc γβαθθφγγη  ( )tftf θγ ,  of System2. The dots denotes the values of the baseline model. 
 
2.3. Results of stochastic simulations 
 
We have simulated the non-stationary system up to time 30000 adding in each iteration normal 
incorrelated zero-mean variates to Equation (7) and to Equation (8)  that may be respectively 
interpreted as noisy trading and random arrival of news. The variances are 0 up to time 20000, in 
order to let the systems to get sufficiently close to the asymptotic dynamics and subsequently are 
0.000025 for the noisy trading and 0.000015 for news information. Table 3 reports the mean, 
variance, skewness and kurtosis of the S&P500 index between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 
2003 and the mean and variances of the statistics obtained through Monte Carlo simulations of 50 
simulated time series. In Table 4 are reported the mean and variance of the proportions of trend 
followers, contrarians and mispricing of the simulated series. It is apparent that all strategies survive 
and are roughly equally balanced and the mispricing averages 1.5. The positive mispricing is due to 
the fact that the price on the one hand does not diverge from the fundamental in the long run, but on 
the other does not catch up with an exponentially increasing fundamental. The values of kurtosis 
and autocorrelation patterns of square returns reported in Figure 12 denote that the model is able to 
generate fat tails in the distributions of return and volatility clustering, however the autocorrelation 
of return is still significant for some time lags. The behaviour of the agents operating in the market 
outlined in this model is highly stylised in that they can choose between three different strategies 
but cannot update the strategies through a learning process and does not allow them to profit out of 
systematic price patterns that would rule out simple autocorrelation at any lag. The model is able to 
generate time series with a unit-root behaviour as denoted by two sample time series of System1 and 
System2 reported in Figure 13. The time series generated by System1 displays larger oscillations in 
price at high frequencies, because of a high switching speed, this in turn increase the variance of 
returns. The switching also induces memory in the time series as denoted by a larger value of square 
return autocorrelations. Therefore a large value of λ  may on the one hand describe turbulent phases 
of the market, on the other hand may give place to a stable equilibrium and affect the size of its 
basin of attraction. The simulations have underlined that the a large value of λ  is associated to a 
wide basin of attraction. So the effects of switching may be very different on a global scale than on 
a local one. The effects on global dynamics of λ  depends anyhow on the whole set of parameter 
values, indeed the bifurcation diagrams of λ  of System1 and System2, illustrated in Figure 14, 
looks very different from each other. In fact, in the neighbourhood of the equilibrium, the trend 
following strategy has the smallest prediction error, therefore a high value of the switching 
parameter induces a higher proportion of agents to switch to the trend following strategy and, since 
when the system is close the equilibrium trend followers behave like fundamentalists, the size of the 
basin of attraction increases. On the other hand, if the system is far from equilibrium a high 
parameter value may induce a high number of agents to select strategies that cause a further 
departure from the equilibrium. In Figure 16-19 are represented the autocorrelograms of simple and 
square returns for parameter values that give place to different asymptotic dynamics of System1 , 
the patterns for System2 are very similar. The autocorrelation patterns for different parameter values 
denote that: 
1) Changes in parameters may leave the asymptotic dynamics qualitatively unchanged, but change 
the autocorrelation, that is, the market memory. Even with parameter values that give place to 
converge toward the equilibrium give place to different autocorrelation patters. Transitional 
dynamics is therefore relevant for nonlinear stochastic systems. 
3) High reaction speeds of market maker determine a quick decay in square return autocorrelations. 
4) High period cycles may determine cyclical and erratic autocorrelation patterns. 
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5) The decays in square return autocorrelations when the system converges to a 2-period cycle may 
be different is the parameter values are inside or outside the Neimark-Sacker boundary, as with ( )37.0,29.0 == ctf cc  and ( )5.0,115.0 == ctf cc . 
 
 Mean Maximum Minimum Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
S&P 500 0.000375309 0.0573148 -0.0686674 0.000110923 -0.0163294 6.49388 
System 1 0.00019482 0.300008 -0.1809 0.0291595 0.792829 7.03811 
System 2 0.00020626 0.0830494 -0.0789404 0.00020626 -0.0152987 5.76908 
Table 3: Statistical properties of S&P 500 and model-generated time series of System1 and System2. 
 
 fn  tfn  M 
 Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance 
System 1 0.276283 0.077107 0.276283 0.077107 1.50303 0.0733081 
System 2 0.33375 0.00327629 0.326909 0.00442164 1.52581 0.0670808 
Table 4: Mean and Variance of proportion of fundamentalists, trend followers and mispricing. 
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Figure 12: Autocorrelations of returns (blue) and square returns (green) of S&P500 (left panel), System1 (middle panel) 
and System2 (right panel) up to fifty lags.  
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Figure 13: Sample time series of System1 and System2. 
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Figure 14:1-parameter bifurcation diagram of tfctf cc γλ ,,,  for System1 (left) and System2 (right). 
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Figure 15:1-parameter bifurcation diagram of cγ  for System1 (left) and System2 (right). 
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Figure 16:Autocorrelations of returns (blue) and square returns (green) when  System1 converges to the equilibrium. 
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Figure 17:Autocorrelations of returns (blue) and square returns (green) when  System1 converges to 2-period cycles. 
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Figure 18:Autocorrelations of returns (blue) and square returns (green) when  System1 converges respectively  to cycles 
of period 4,3 and 5. 
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Figure 19:Autocorrelations of returns (blue) and square returns (green) when  System1 converges to strange attractors. 
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3. The Dynamics of Price and Fundamental Value in a Market with 
Heterogeneous Strategies and Positive Share Supply 
 
3.1. The model 
 
We will generalize the model by considering now a financial market where one risky and one 
riskless asset are traded, composed of homogeneous investors who allocate their wealth across 
fundamentalist, trend following and contrarian strategies and maximize a CRRA utility function 
defined in terms of wealth. Following Chiarella, Dieci, Gardini (2006), each agent maximize the 
expected value of the following utility function: 
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Following the same notation of previous chapter, and defining m as the logarithm of the dividend-
price ratio, the solution to the maximization of (1) with respect to W imply that the fraction of 
wealth invested in the risky asset is approximated by: 
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Where m is the log-dividend yield Dt/Pt-1. As proved in Chiarella and He (2001). Chiarella, Dieci, 
Gardini (2006) prove that the fundamental values would evolve according to the following 
difference equation: 
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Where φ  is the growth rate of the dividends, which are assume to grow exponentially at constant 
rate and r  is a discount rate defined by: 
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Q is defined as the value of the outstand shares as a fraction of total wealth. We will assume that W 
is constant, that is new stock issue is a fixed proportion of the variation of wealth. We also assume 
that the fundamental is not know exactly but that agents update the expected fundamental value 
according to the following process: 
 
 (5) 
 
Let us define now the expected mispricing t
E
t
E
t PFM −=  and the change in expected fundamental 
E
t
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E
t FFF 1−−=∆ . The stationary system is given by the following equations: 
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The system is characterised by 2∞  equilibria, indeed every element of the plane ( δ,M )  is a fixed 
point of System (6), as the following proposition shows: 
 
Proposition 1. The system has 2∞  fixed point such as c
E
tf F ψφψ −=∆==  , αφ /=EM , 
1;0 === tfcf nnn . Every value of  the dividend-price ratio m and the actual mispricing M are 
compatible with the fixed point. 
Proof. The proof parallels that of Proposition 1 of the previous chapter, furthermore It can be easily 
proved that the Jacobian of (6) has two eigenvalue equal to 1, the proof parallel that of previous 
chapter concerning stability. Therefore the stability cannot be studied by linearization. 
 
3.2. Numerical simulations 
 
As in previous chapter we performed a Monte Carlo simulation by iterating the system up to time 
30000 adding in each iteration normal incorrelated zero-mean variates to the equations governing 
the dynamics of the return and mispricing with variances equal to 0 up to time 20000, in order to let 
the systems to get sufficiently close to the asymptotic dynamics and subsequently are 0.000025 for 
the noisy trading and 0.000015 for news information. The parameter and initial values are reported 
in Tables (1) and (2). Tables (3), (4) and (5) report the statistical results of numerical simulations. 
Figure (1) displays a sample time series of mispricing (left panel) and price (right panel). Figure (2) 
and (3) display respectively the autocorrelation of returns and square returns and 2-dimensions 
bifurcation diagrams. 
 
 
The results of simulation can be summarised in the following points:  
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1) the introduction of uncertainty in fundamental value and positive share supply does not 
affect the statistical results much. 
 
2) Mispricing is characterised by high variance at high frequencies with long period trends 
even with a learing speed quite high (0.1 percent daily). 
 
3) Estimated mispricing match on average the actual mispricing, but is characterised by a lower 
volatility because of learning lags. 
 
4) The discount rate is much higher than the risk-free rate (roughly double on annual basis) and 
the variance is very high. This induces a high volatility in the fundamental value, therefore 
price volatility may be explained also by rapid changes in the fundamental due not to the 
arrival of news, but to variations in risk preference and conditional variances. Price volatility 
is therefore endogenouosly generated by market activity. The variations in discount rate 
contributes to explaining the phenomenon denoted as Equity Premium Puzzle, because 
phase characterised by high discount rate are associated to high expected return and high 
conditional variance estimated by technical traders. 
 
5) Price tends to have high-frequencies oscillations with less volatility than in a model without 
positive share supply and learning. 
 
6) Fundamentalists may perform a stabilizing action if they believe that price will revert to 
fundamental quickly, however this depends strongly on initial conditions due to the Cantor 
structure of the ( )η−a  parameter space and illustrated in Figure 4. 
 
7) Price divergence is less likely to occur unless with a high reaction speed of market marker. 
 
 
 α β g γtf γtc θtf θc ctf cc a fc  η φ  λ Q 
 
0.0005 0.002 0.00025 1000 1000 1.6 1.6 0.3 0.2 46 0.1 0.006 0.0002 1.4 0.4 
Table 1:parameters values. 
 
 
 ( )0tfψ  ( )0cψ  ( )0tfZ  ( )0cZ  nf ntf vf vc m 
 
0.01 0 0 0 0 1/3 0 1/3 -9.2101 
Table 2: initial values of system variables in numerical simulations. 
 
 
 Mean Maximum Minimum Variance Skewness Kurtosis 
 
0.00020018 0.0927566 -0.0629338 0.000223983 0.106366 4.27953 
Table 3: Statistical properties of Monte Carlo Simulations. 
 
 fn  tfn  M 
 Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance 
 0.306485 0.062967 0.305589 0.0857697 1.61962 0.897962 
Table 4: Mean and Variance of proportion of fundamentalists, trend followers and mispricing. 
 
 
EM  r 
 Mean Variance Mean Variance 
 1.50438 0.309615 0.00038863 0.561815 
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Table 5: Mean and Variance of expected mispricing and discount rate. 
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Figure 1: Sample time series of mispricing and price. 
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Figure 2: Autocorrelations of returns (blue) and square returns (green) up to fifty lags. 
 
 48 
 
Figure 3: 2-dimensional bifurcation diagrams ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( );,;,;,;,;,;,;, 21 ffctfctf cgacc γβαθθφγγη  ( )tftf θγ , ; ( )tftfc γ, .  
. 
 
 
Figure 4: magnification of ( )η,a  bifurcation diagram. 
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Conclusion 
 
We have outlined continuous and discrete time models of a financial market with heterogeneous 
interacting agents. The dynamical systems shows periodic, quasi-periodic and strange attractors, 
and are able to generate some stylized facts present in real markets, even in a purely deterministic 
setting: excess kurtosis, volatility clustering and long memory. We have indeed tuned the 
parameters in order to  produce artificial time series with statistical properties similar to those of the 
daily time series of S&P500 index between 1 January 1990 and 31 December 2003. Mean, variance 
and kurtosis  tend  to match quite close those of the S&P500, whereas skewness and autocorrelation 
patterns are somewhat affected by the long run exponentially increasing fundamental value and 
price.  The model analysed in chapter 1, while unable to completely cancel the autocorrelations of 
returns and to give rise to square autocorrelations that decay according to a power law, allows for a 
reduction in the autocorrelation with respect to TDG, which is characterized only by fundamentalist 
agents and shows a very high negative first order autocorrelation, because fundamentalists tend to 
drive the price back to fundamental too quickly. Even in the case where fundamentalists are the 
only agents present in the market, they are unable to drive the price back to the fundamental on a 
steady state trajectory, because of both the increasing risk aversion as they trade in order to profit 
out of a mispricing and the delays in processing the information from the market. Moreover, the 
increase in the fundamentalist reaction speed on the one hand may destroy the strange attractor 
giving rise to a chaotic transient, on the other may even increase the disorder in the system, as 
pointed out by the values of the Lyapunov exponent, because the fundamentalists trigger a strong 
response of technical traders. It may also be possible that, when the fraction of fundamentalists is 
low, trend followers and contrarians give rise to synchronization in the system, bringing about a 
dramatic change in the dynamics. In this case, the system exhibits the phenomenon of intermittency, 
that is, regular phase interrupted by chaotic bursts in the dynamics. The introduction of an 
evolutionary switching between technical traders leads to an increase in the volatility and in the 
kurtosis, provided that the speed of switching is not too high because otherwise the increase in the 
variance makes it less likely that returns will fall in the tails of the distributions. The models 
described in chapter 2 and 3 following the standard paradigm of utility maximization, but, 
differently from most of the literature on interacting agents, utilize a flow-based approach where 
excess demand is determined by the difference between optimal and current holdings of the asset 
and consider a realistic values for the interest rate and the growth rate. We have proved that a high 
value of the swithching speed while, on the hand, stabilizes the system locally, on the other give rise 
to high-frequency high-volatility oscillations and price divergence in some cases. The local stability 
is determined by the reaction speed of trend followers and the market maker, but the behavior of the 
other investors affect the global dynamics. Those models confirm that fundamentalists are not able 
to stabilize the market, unless they are not fully informed on the fundamental and believe that price 
is strongly reverting about the fundamental. Even in this case the final outcome is uncertain because 
of coexistence of attractors and Cantor structure of the parameter space. There are many ways to 
extend the models. While in the present paper the switching and reaction speeds are constant, an 
extension will render them state-dependent. Another extension will consider time delays distributed 
according to distributions that give more importance to more recent observations as well as 
technical traders who take into account the whole history of past prices. Such extensions should 
produce time series with long run chaotic dynamics displaying more realistic statistical properties, 
mainly in terms of autocorrelation patterns and long memory. 
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